Disinformation, Corporate Accountability, and the Politics of Indonesia-Singapore Interdependence
The debate surrounding transboundary haze and disinformation in Indonesia-Singapore relations reveals a far more complex issue than the mere circulation of false information on social media. On the one hand, Singapore has legitimate reasons to protect its population from disinformation that could exacerbate bilateral tensions and undermine public trust. On the other hand, Indonesia has an equally legitimate interest in scrutinising economic activities, investment networks, and cross-border corporate ownership structures operating within its territory.
In his commentary published by Channel NewsAsia, Nicholas Fang warned that disinformation campaigns could harm Singapore even when Singaporeans were not their primary targets. He linked several social media narratives concerning the haze crisis, diplomatic relations, the alleged influence of Temasek and GIC over MSCI, and Indonesia’s reduction of gas exports to Singapore. Fang also identified patterns of coordinated content dissemination, although he acknowledged that the actors behind these activities and their ultimate objectives had yet to be established.
Fang’s warning deserves serious consideration. However, a more fundamental question needs to be examined: how should disinformation be distinguished from legitimate political and economic criticism? This distinction matters because efforts to protect the information environment must not become mechanisms for restricting public scrutiny of cross-border economic interests.
Distinguishing Disinformation from Legitimate Criticism
In information security studies, disinformation refers to the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information to influence public perceptions or behaviour. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), however, involves a more specific dimension: information manipulation and interference associated with foreign actors. Consequently, the existence of false online posts or coordinated account activity does not, by itself, establish the presence of a foreign-sponsored FIMI operation.
CNA Verify reported nearly 400 social media posts promoting narratives that Singapore was interfering in Indonesia’s domestic affairs. These posts attracted approximately 12 million views, with around half of those views generated by just ten posts. Some accounts also circulated claims about an alleged meeting involving Singapore’s ambassador and prominent Indonesian figures. Those named in the claims denied that the meeting had taken place. CNA Verify identified patterns of coordination, including accounts created on the same day and publishing similar content within short intervals. Nevertheless, the identities of the operators and the parties directing these activities remained unverified.
These findings provide grounds for investigating possible information manipulation. However, attribution to foreign actors requires stronger evidence. Digital coordination may indicate inauthentic behaviour, but it does not automatically establish who organised the activity, who financed it, or what strategic interests motivated it.
This is where conceptual precision becomes essential. For example, allegations that Temasek and GIC influenced MSCI’s decisions lack sufficient supporting evidence and have been denied. Such allegations should not be treated as established facts. However, examining the role of Singapore-based institutional investors in Indonesia’s economy remains a legitimate subject for academic research and public scrutiny.
Similarly, criticism of companies domiciled in Singapore or connected to Singapore-based corporate networks cannot automatically be categorised as anti-Singapore sentiment. When such criticism rests on verifiable data, documentation, and reasoned arguments, it constitutes a legitimate part of democratic accountability.
The issue, therefore, is not whether to defend Singapore or Indonesia. It is how to ensure that disinformation is addressed on the basis of evidence while legitimate criticism retains its place in public debate.
Singapore: A Victim of Haze and a Centre of Regional Economic Interests
Indonesia-Singapore relations cannot be understood solely through the framework of a source country generating pollution and a neighbouring country suffering its consequences. Although this framework captures the environmental dimension of transboundary haze, it does not adequately explain the economic and corporate networks connecting the two countries.
Singapore is one of Southeast Asia’s principal financial and investment centres. Many multinational companies use Singapore as their regional headquarters, financing hub, or jurisdiction of incorporation. This position generates considerable economic and strategic advantages, but it also carries responsibilities when corporate networks connected to Singapore operate in other countries.
A report released by Greenpeace Indonesia and Greenpeace Malaysia in November 2026 provides important context. The report identified 17,390 haze-source points in Indonesia between 8 August and 31 October 2026. Of these, 1,776 were located within 46 oil palm concessions, while another 2,586 were identified within 28 industrial timber plantation concessions. Greenpeace also identified more than 40 oil palm and pulpwood companies linked to Singaporean and Malaysian companies that had haze-source points within their concession areas.
Several companies mentioned in the report include PT Damai Agro Sejahtera, associated with Bumitama; PT Kayung Agro Lestari, associated with First Resources; and PT Bumi Mekar Hijau, associated with APP or Sinar Mas. The report also identified other companies connected to regional corporate groups.
These findings must be interpreted carefully. The presence of hotspots or haze-source points within concession areas does not, in itself, establish that the concession holders initiated the fires or bear legal responsibility for them. Determining responsibility requires investigation, evidence of causation, identification of the parties involved, and appropriate legal proceedings. Nevertheless, these findings provide sufficient grounds for further scrutiny of concession management, corporate ownership structures, supply chains, and corporate oversight mechanisms.
This is an important dimension that is often overlooked in public debate. Singapore is indeed among the countries affected by haze originating in Indonesia. At the same time, Singapore is part of a regional economic network connected to companies conducting business activities in Indonesia. These two positions are not mutually exclusive.
Consequently, discussions about responsibility for transboundary haze should not stop at demanding improvements in Indonesia’s environmental governance. They should also examine beneficial ownership, parent-company accountability, investment financing, and corporate responsibility across jurisdictions.
Extraterritorial Law and the Principle of Reciprocal Accountability
Singapore’s use of its Transboundary Haze Pollution Act (THPA) through the National Environment Agency (NEA) demonstrates that its response to transboundary haze extends beyond diplomatic engagement. The government has also employed domestic legal instruments to obtain information about companies suspected of having links to cross-border pollution.
In October 2026, NEA issued notices to several Singapore-based and Indonesian companies. These notices formed part of an information-gathering and investigative process; they were not judicial findings that the companies had committed offences. The Singapore government has also indicated plans to strengthen its legal instruments for addressing transboundary haze.
In principle, these measures can be understood as efforts to protect Singapore’s public interest. However, they also raise questions about the consistency of cross-border accountability.
If Singapore can use its domestic legal framework to seek information or accountability from companies connected to activities in Indonesia, Indonesia has an equally legitimate basis for strengthening its scrutiny of companies, investors, and financing networks linked to Singaporean jurisdictions. Such scrutiny must remain grounded in law, evidence, and due process. Nevertheless, the principle of reciprocity is essential to ensuring that bilateral economic relations do not produce unequal standards of accountability.
Indonesia does not need to reject Singapore’s law enforcement cooperation. On the contrary, it should encourage information-sharing mechanisms, joint investigations, corporate ownership transparency, and stronger coordination between enforcement authorities. Such cooperation would be more productive than allowing the haze issue to deteriorate into mutual accusations between the two countries.
National sovereignty should not be used as a justification for protecting companies that have been proven to violate the law. Equally, cross-border cooperation must not become a justification for unilateral intervention in Indonesian territory or jurisdiction. What is needed is cooperation based on consent, legal certainty, respect for sovereignty, and equal accountability.
Economic Interdependence and Indonesia’s Bargaining Position
Indonesia-Singapore relations illustrate what international relations scholarship describes as complex interdependence. In the Indonesia-Singapore context, this interdependence is reflected in investment, trade, energy, financial services, human mobility, and corporate networks. These relationships generate mutual benefits, but their advantages and vulnerabilities are not necessarily distributed equally.
Singapore enjoys structural advantages as a regional financial, trade, and services hub. Indonesia, meanwhile, possesses a large domestic market, natural resources, a substantial production base, and a strategically important geographic position. These differences create a relationship of mutual dependence, but they may also generate asymmetric interdependence.
The concept of asymmetric interdependence helps explain how states with greater capacity to control access to particular economic networks may enjoy stronger bargaining positions.However, this theory should not be used to conclude prematurely that Singapore is exploiting its economic position to pressure Indonesia. It is more appropriately applied to identify potential structural imbalances and examine how economic networks shape the policy choices of both countries.
Debates surrounding MSCI and Indonesia’s reduction of gas exports illustrate why these distinctions matter.
First, in October 2026, MSCI announced a consultation on the possible reclassification of Indonesia’s equity market from Emerging Market to Standalone Market. MSCI cited investor concerns about opaque shareholding structures and suspected coordinated trading practices. Allegations that Temasek or GIC controlled this decision are not supported by sufficient evidence. Indonesia should address the underlying market concerns through greater transparency, improved governance, and stronger investor protection rather than speculation about external actors.
Second, Indonesia reduced part of its gas supply to Singapore beginning on 24 October 2026 to prioritise domestic energy requirements, particularly for Batam, Bintan, and Sumatra. This policy should be understood within the context of national energy security and contractual obligations. Indonesia has the right to regulate the use of its natural resources, but it must also observe applicable legal provisions and commercial commitments.
These two issues demonstrate that bilateral economic relations cannot be interpreted solely through narratives of external pressure or retaliation. Each policy must be assessed according to its legal basis, policy objectives, available evidence, and actual consequences. Indonesia must protect its national interests without generating uncertainty that could undermine investor confidence and regional partnerships.
When Criticism Becomes Securitised
Another issue that deserves attention is the tendency to frame political and economic debates as security threats. Singapore must ensure that its information resilience agenda does not blur the distinction between deliberate manipulation and evidence-based criticism. Indonesia must apply the same standard. The Indonesian government should not invoke foreign interference as a means of avoiding public scrutiny of domestic policies or corporate activities.
A healthy information environment does not require the restriction of dissent. Rather, information resilience depends on a society capable of scrutinising claims, comparing sources, recognising the interests behind particular narratives, and distinguishing facts from propaganda.
In bilateral relations, this approach would be more constructive than exchanging accusations. Both countries should develop joint verification mechanisms, crisis communication channels, data-sharing arrangements, and greater transparency to reduce opportunities for manipulation.
Towards a More Equitable Bilateral Relationship
Indonesia does not need to adopt a confrontational policy towards Singapore. The economic and strategic relationship between the two countries is too important to be reduced to information disputes or temporary diplomatic tensions. However, constructive cooperation does not require Indonesia to disregard its national interests or avoid criticism of regional economic structures.
At least four policy priorities deserve greater attention.
First, Indonesia needs to improve transparency in the ownership and control structures of corporations operating in its natural resource sectors. Information concerning beneficial owners, corporate parent structures, sources of financing, and supply chains should be sufficiently traceable. This is important not only for environmental law enforcement but also for preventing companies from evading responsibility through cross-border corporate arrangements.
Second, Indonesia and Singapore should strengthen cooperation in environmental law enforcement. Satellite data-sharing, joint investigations, complaint mechanisms, and coordinated enforcement can help identify responsible parties more accurately. Such cooperation must guarantee due process and respect the jurisdiction of each country.
Third, both countries need to establish clearer boundaries between countering disinformation and protecting freedom of expression. False content deliberately produced to mislead the public must be addressed. However, criticism of investment, corporations, energy policy, and cross-border economic relations must remain part of open public debate.
Fourth, Indonesia needs to strengthen its domestic capacity to manage economic dependencies. Market diversification, greater domestic value addition, stronger energy infrastructure, capital market reform, and improved investment governance would enhance Indonesia’s bargaining position without damaging its relations with regional partners.
Singapore is right that disinformation can generate consequences beyond national borders and undermine public trust. Indonesia also has a strong interest in preventing information manipulation that could damage bilateral relations. However, responses to disinformation must remain evidence-based and must not obscure legitimate economic and political questions that deserve public debate.
Singapore is not merely a small state vulnerable to false information. It is also a regional economic actor with a strategic position in Southeast Asia’s investment, financial, trade, and corporate networks. This position generates economic advantages, but it also carries responsibilities when companies connected to Singapore conduct activities with consequences in other countries.
Conversely, Indonesia cannot invoke sovereignty as a reason to avoid responsibility for environmental problems occurring within its territory. It must improve forest and land governance, enforce the law against parties proven to be responsible, and fulfil its regional obligations. However, responsibility should not be assigned solely to the country where production takes place without examining the corporate ownership, financing, and profit networks that extend across national borders.
The central question in Indonesia-Singapore relations is not simply whether Singapore has become a target of disinformation. A more fundamental question is how both countries can manage economic interdependence without allowing unequal power relations, corporate opacity, or the securitisation of information to weaken public accountability.
