Wisdom Beyond Jargon: President Prabowo Subianto’s chant of “Free Palestine
President Prabowo Subianto’s chant of “Free Palestine” at Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor on September 19, 2026, became a headline easily interpreted as a shift in posture. Almost a year earlier, Prabowo concluded his speech at the UN General Assembly with the word “Shalom,” after stating that Palestinian-Israeli peace requires the recognition of a Palestinian state alongside guarantees for Israel’s safety and security. The contrast is indeed journalistically compelling. However, such gestures cannot automatically be simplified as a fundamental shift in foreign policy.
In September 2025, Prabowo did not merely utter “Shalom” as a nod to Israel. In that same speech, he unequivocally reaffirmed Indonesia’s full support for the two-state solution and Palestinian independence. Prabowo Subianto stated that Israel’s security must be recognized and guaranteed as part of a lasting peace. In that context, “Shalom” served as a closing to a speech centered on reconciliation, coexistence, and peace—not as a declaration of support for the policies of the Israeli government. Therefore, relying on a single word as an indicator of a political reorientation is not only unfair, but also misleading and dangerous. Such framing is counterproductive to the global peace campaign, which ought to draw us into a broader context when interpreting symbolic gestures.
Thus, when Prabowo chanted “Free Palestine” at Gontor a year later and accepted a keffiyeh presented by the Palestinian Ambassador while addressing the suffering of the Palestinian people amid broader strategic ideas, the deeper context becomes evident. Prabowo stated that the suffering of Palestinians should compel Indonesia to build its national strength so that it can meaningfully assist the oppressed. He explicitly linked solidarity with Palestine to the concept of national power. Palestine emerged not only as a humanitarian issue or an identity symbol, but as a stark reminder of the limits of Indonesia’s capacity to influence international conflicts. This is where the two speeches reveal a single, coherent line of thought.
At the UN, Prabowo articulated the conditions required to establish peace: an independent Palestine and a secure Israel under a two-state solution. At Gontor, he articulated the conditions required for Indonesia to assist the oppressed: Indonesia must be strong.
While the language differed, both addresses converged on a single premise: national capacity dictates a country’s ability to execute its foreign policy. Therefore, cultural and linguistic expressions imbued with political spirit—such as “Shalom” and “Free Palestine”—are more accurately understood as manifestations of President Prabowo Subianto’s strategic wisdom.
To recall, in May 2025, Prabowo stated that Indonesia was prepared to open diplomatic relations with Israel provided that Israel recognizes the State of Palestine. That statement demonstrated an openness to normalization, but that openness was strictly conditional. Palestinian independence was explicitly established as a prerequisite for any change in Indonesian-Israeli diplomatic relations.
In September 2025, Prabowo reaffirmed support for the two-state solution at the UN. By November 2025, Indonesia declared its readiness to contribute up to 20,000 personnel for a potential peacekeeping mission in Gaza, should an international mandate be established, with a focus on healthcare and infrastructure development.
In April 2026, Indonesia dispatched additional humanitarian aid to Gaza. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded that total Indonesian assistance from October 2023 to February 2026 reached approximately US$22.55 million, weighing around 2,580 tons.
Throughout this year, Indonesia has repeatedly joined Arab and Muslim nations in joint statements reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
For Indonesia and Prabowo, these actions demonstrate an unbroken continuity of support for Palestine.
Indonesia does not have to treat “Free Palestine” and “Israel must be secure” as mutually exclusive positions. Conceptually, both statements coexist within the same framework: Palestine must be independent and Israel must live in security as two coexisting states.
Indonesia maintains its support for Palestinian independence without allowing that stance to close off diplomatic avenues. Indonesia preserves its relations with the United States, European nations, Arab states, Trkiye, and various other global powers. In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this pattern allows Indonesia to remain a steadfast supporter of Palestine while retaining the diplomatic leverage necessary to contribute to conflict resolution.
Ultimately, the issue is not “Shalom versus Free Palestine.” The far more crucial question is whether Indonesia can leverage its support for Palestine, diplomatic agility, humanitarian assistance, and national capacity to deliver tangible contributions toward resolving the conflict.
